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DEBTOR EXEMPTION IN CONNECTICUT AND NEW YORK
STATUTES dealing with debtor exemption must serve a double purpose: to
make just allowance for the daily needs of the debtor and to provide creditors
with adequate methods for the collection of their claims. In the past, creditors
have been concerned mainly with reaching physical property of the debtor
which existed in a teadily available form. The increasing importance of
trusts and the development of installment selling, however, have brought into
prominence as debtors the cestui and the wage earner, whose resources are
available solely in an intermittent flow. The fairly crystallized body of law
which surrounded creditor relief has had, therefore, to be readjusted to fit
these new problems. This process of readjustment, as might be expected,
has taken divergent forms in different states. The two prominent indus-
trialized states of New York and Connecticut, recognizing the inadequacy of
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standard provisions for levy and sale,' have both afforded creditors the addi-
tional remedies of garnishment2 and proceedings supplementary to judg-
ment ;3 in their approach, however, the statutes in the two states are funda-
mentally different. The Connecticut statutes generally provide the creditor
with but a single process for each situation. In New York, on the other
hand, sections dealing with the mode of creditor relief overlap; different
types of debtor are subject to different treatment, and often several sections
are applicable to one type. This diversity of remedy has led to considerable
uncertainty as to which section should apply,4 and the confusion is heightened
by the fact that a debtor may be exempted under one provision but not under
another. Available judicial authority does not, perhaps, dispel this uncertainty,
with absolute finality, since cases in this field, as a result of the small amounts
generally involved, seldom reach the higher courts and the lower court deci-
sions do not seem wholly uniform. It is possible, however, that the conflict
is more apparent than real. The purpose of this Comment is to determine
whether the varied New York provisions have been sufficiently reconciled
and correlated by the decisions to provide a workable system; and whether
the complex New York provisions or the more unified provisions of the
Connecticut statutes have more successfully solved the modern problems of
creditor relief.
* In accordance with well-established New England usage,5 the Connecticut
creditor may garnish or attach 'at the' institution of his action" and thus
effectively tie up the debtor's assets for the payment of the anticipated judg-
ment.1  Garnishment, however, is restricted to debts already due the debtor
1. Surveys made prior to the recent changes in supplementary proceedings disclose
that from 75% to 90% of the money judgments rendered in New York City remained
unsatisfied. See Levien, Making Money Judgments Collectible, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 20,
1934, p. 1900, col. 1; 1 JoNs HOPKINS UNIVERSITY INsTITUTE OF LAV, SURVEY or
LITIGATION IN NEw Yoaix (1931) 3.
2. CoNST. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5763; N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 684.
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 773 ct seq. The
Connecticut provision for wage earner installment payments is in effect a supplementary
proceeding. Provision has also been made for examination of the judgment debtor, but
no orders may be obtained in that proceeding directing either the debtor or third parties
to deliver to the creditor property of the debtor. See CoRm. GarX. STAT. (1930) § 5830.
4. Many writers have attempted to disentangle the snarls into which the New York
courts have been led by the statutes. Some of the better treatments of the problems are:
Newman and Kaufman, The New York Garnishee Execution As a Practical Remedy
(1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 255; Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments in New
York: Supplementary Pi-oceedings (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 1007; Cohen, Collection of
Money Judgments in New York: Third Party Orders (1935) 35 Coi. L. REV. 1196;
Cohen, Execution Process and Life Insurance (1939) 39 CoL. L. REy. 139.
5. ARNOLD AND JAmEs, TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS (1936) 462, n. 6.
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5763.
7. Imprisonment for debt is still a possibility in Connecticut. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1930) § 5803; cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 764. For property exempted from garnish-
ment, see HANNA, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS (1st ed. 1931) 91.
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and those to become due from a deceased's or an insolvent's estate.8 When
judgment has been obtained, the garnishee may pay the amount caught by
the garnishment. If he fails to pay the sheriff upon service, he may be sued
on a scire facias, and thereby be made a judgment debtor." Wages, which
are not included in the traditional methods of relief, may be neither garnished
nor assigned, but in line with the modern trend may be levied upon through
a judicial decree establishing definite installments which the debtor must
regularly pay.'0 The court has been given much discretion in fiing the size
of these installment payments, since in establishing this sum it takes into
consideration the general circumstances of the defendant, such as pending
actions or outstanding judgments, the debtor's income, and the amount of
the creditor's claim.' 1
The limitation of installment orders to a reasonable amount in view of all
the surrounding circumstances may induce Connecticut to modify its rule
that creditors may not interfere with the wage payments of state or municipal
employees who hold positions requiring an oath of office.12 This principle
was enunciated before the institution of the present provision for installment
orders, at a time when courts still recognized wage garnishnent. Its basis
was not that garnishment would unduly burden the governmental instru-
mentality served with process, but rather that the complete collection of wages
which garnishment permitted to the creditor, would deprive the employee of
his means of support.' 3 Presumably, therefore, "his efficiency as an officer
would be impaired, if not destroyed, and public interest would suffer serious
detriment." 14 Since New York, where provision for installment orders against
8. Coxx. Gax. STAT. (1930) § 5763. Although the statute says "persons" may be
garnished, this, of course, includes corporations. Knox v. Protection Ins. Co., 9 Conn.
430 (1833).
9. Comx. GENT. STAT. (1930) § 5814. The creditor has no claim to payment from
the garnishee until judgment has been rendered against the debtor and an execution
attempted. See Century Indemnity Co. v. Kofsky, 115 Conn. 193, 161 Atd. 101 (1932).
The garnisher-creditor must wait until the claims of prior garnishers have been settled
before he may obtain his scire facias. Hawthorne Sash & Door Co. v. New London,
99 Conn. 672, 122 Atl. 658 (1923). While a legacy is garnishable by the legatee's
creditors before the will is probated, a scire facias cannot issue until the legacy is due.
johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 34 Atl. 709 (1S95).
10. Co x. GE\. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d.
11. Ibid.
12. If no oath of office is required, the official's salary may be garnished. Seymour
v. Over River School Dist., 53 Conn. 502, 3 At. 552 (18) (school teacher's wages
may be garnished). Ordinary debts due from a town to a debtor may be garnished.
Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416 (1850). Money collected on execution by a sherir? in
his official capacity may be garnished, since he is acting as an agent of the executing
creditor and not of the law.
13. Prudential Mortgage and Investment Co. Y. New Britain, 123 Conn. 3 0, 195
At. 609 (1937).
14. See Prudential Mortgage and Investment Co. v. New Britain, 123 Conn. 390,
393, 195 Atl. 609, 610 (1937).
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wage earners is similar to Connecticut, allows such decrees to be issued against
governmental employees,15 it is to be expected that Connecticut will follow
the New York interpretation in this, as well as in most situations where wage
earner installment orders are in question.
In New York, the creditor of a wage earner is not restricted to an install-
ment order as he is in Connecticut. Where execution on a judgment has been
returned wholly or partly unsatisfied, the creditor may resort to garnishment,
which permits a continuing levy not exceeding ten per cent of any income
or earnings due the debtor, if these earnings amount to $12.00 a week or
more.16 Wages of state and municipal employees, 17 as well as payments in
the form of commissions and trust income, are expressly included within
this remedy.' 8 While only one garnishment may attach at a time, outstanding
processes will be fulfilled according to priority of service.10 Supplementary
proceedings, however, may be instituted 20 without attempted execution2" or
even in the face of similar measures by other creditors. 22 Through this ex-
pedient, the creditor may obtain a third party order commanding payment
from the debtor's debtor 23 or a decree directly against the debtor, instructing
15. See notes 18 and 38, infra.
16. N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr § 684. Garnishment may also be had for jurisdictional
purposes. See N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Act §§ 902, 903.
17. Salary of county officer is garnishable. Rickey v. Slingerland, 143 Misc. 583,
256 N. Y. Supp. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
18. N. Y. Civ. Pa~c. Ace § 684.
19. Friedenberg v. Hollander, 157 Misc. 663, 284 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Priority of judgment is immaterial. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Elmira v. Lovell,
139 Misc. 891, 249 N. Y. Supp. 493 (Sup. Ct. 1931). For a discussion of the priority
problem, see Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. Rev. 504.
20. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 773 provides for the institution of these proceedings at
any time before the judgment is satisfied, vacated, or barred by the Statute of Limitations
(20 years under N. Y. Civ. Pnmc. Acr § 44). The proceedings continue until closed, or
until discontinued by consent or by court order, and are not to be deemed abandoned
through nonactivity until after two years following their commencement. N. Y. CIV. PaAC.
Acr § 802.
21. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 773. It has been impliedly held that supplementary pro-
ceedings in accordance with N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 773 et seCq. may be brought in the
federal district court in New York which rendered the money judgment. Capital Co. v.
Fox, 299 U. S. 105 (1936), aff'g, 15 F. Supp. 677 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
22. Order under § 793 will be upheld over objection that the debtor is required by
previous orders to pay other creditors. D. Appleton Century Co., Inc. v. Partridge,
255 App. Div. 830, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 47 (4th Dep't 1938). Such orders will be granted
despite a pending appeal of the judgment, if the debtor fails to obtain a stay of execution.
Nat. City Bank of N. Y. v. Clarke, 246 App. Div. 636, 283 N. Y. Supp. 485 (2d Dep't
1935). But supplementary proceedings will not lie against an executor or administrator
upon a judgment recovered against him in his representative capacity, since one creditor
could thereby obtain a preference over the other creditors of the estate. Dander Corp.
v. Connor, 169 Misc. 686, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 471 (N. Y. City Ct. 1938).
23. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Acr §§ 794, 796. While permissive orders to third parties may
be issued under § 794(1) without notice to the judgment debtor, mandatory orders under
§ 794(2) require such notice. Section 796, which permits orders without notice to judg-
[Vol. 48: 13771380
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him to honor the judgment by installment payments.24 But these provisions
may not authorize the seizure of property otherwise immune from levy and
sale,25 property held in a trust created by someone other than the debtor,
and "earnings by the judgment debtor for his personal services rendered
within sixty days next before the institution of the special proceeding; when
. . . those earnings are necessary for the use of a family wholly or partially
supported by his wages."2' 06 It is further stipulated that orders for installment
payments by debtors may only be made after due regard for the reasonable
requirements of the debtor and his dependents, and for prior court orders
and garmishments.
-7
Section 793 of the New York Civil Practice Act introduced installment
orders into that state in 1935. This procedure savors of an equity in personam
decree, while Section 684, the garnishment provision, resembles an old com-
mon law action dating from the custom of London merchants. Courts have
therefore been reluctant to allow resort to Section 793 unless the creditor is
confronted by an obstacle to process under Section 684.28 A more liberal
attitude was postulated in Economy Leases v. Bierman.3 There it was held
that a judgment creditor should not be required to have recourse to Section
684 before applying for relief under Section 793 unless garnishment would
be fully as adequate as an installment order. By this criterion installment
orders would not be available to creditors of employees of the state, or a
municipality or a large corporation which would honor process, unless the
debtor's earnings were so large that he could reasonably be expected to pay
more than ten per cent of his wages toward the judgment. But garnishment
would not be required where the circumstances disclosed that the employer
would discharge the debtor or would aid him in frustrating the creditor. The
principle of Economy Leases v. Bierman is not only more reasonable than
the court's earlier position, but also appears to be a consummation of the
legislative intent3 0 that installment orders were to be granted "notwithstanding
ment debtors, applies only to cases where the debtor's tangible property is in the hands
of a third party. (Money is included as a tangible item.) Bartley . Bartley, 255 App.
Div. 992, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 327 (2d Dep't 1938). For effect of the service of a third
party order see (1937) 6 Foan, mH L. REv. 321.
24. N. Y. Civ. PRA Acr § 793.
25. The specific property exempted by this provision is listed in VAIT, M\ANzUAL 01'
SUPPLEME-N"TARY PROCEEDINGS AND GARrNsHEE ExcunTos (1936) 391-410 and WV0arH-
mA-N, COLLEcION OF MONEY JUDGM'ENTs (1936) 107-123.
26. N. Y. Cirv. PRasc. Acr § 792. The doctrine of In re Trustees of Board of Publi-
cation and Sabbath School Work, 22 Misc. 645, 50 N. Y. Supp. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1893)
that supplementary proceedings could not reach property acquired subsequent to service
was overruled by an amendment in 1938 to N. Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr § 781.
27. N. Y. Civ. PRAuc. Ac § 793.
28. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaroff, 157 Misc. 796, 234 N. Y. Supp. 655 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1935); Dibner v. Cousminer, 157 Misc. 229, 283 N. Y. Supp. 369 (N. Y. City
Ct 1935).
29. 159 Misc. 367, 286 N. Y. Supp. 732 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
30. As expressed by the opening words of N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. Act § 793.
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the provisions of sections six hundred eighty-four and six hundred eighty-live
of this act." Although there are apparently no decisions reported subsequent
to Econony Leases v. Bierman, the cases which have appeared in the Ne,
York Lazz. Journal indicate that its approach is now the prevailing New York
rule.
31
Differences in the scope of garnishment and installment orders in New
York have resulted in some debtors being immune from one process, while
still answerable under the other. The conflict is due, in part, to the phrase-
ology employed. The words "earnings" and "profits" mark the limits to
which Section 684 may be applied, whereas Section 793 speaks of "income,
however, or whenever earned or acquired." Since "earnings" have been inter-
preted to embrace all pecuniary or proprietary benefits that may be included
within the remuneration, 32 it is a more comprehensive category than wages.
Payments in merchandise 33 or free rent 34 are thus as much as part of earnings
as are monetary awards. Although "profits" have been liberally construed
to represent any advantage or gain resulting from the investment of capital
or the acquisition of money beyond the amount expended, 35 garnishment of
these funds is handicapped by the difficulty of determining an exact amount
upon which execution may be levied. A far better procedure for their col-
lection is provided by an installment order under Section 793. This section
has an even broader range than garnishment since the limits of "income"
include not only earnings and profits, but even contributions and gratuities,
if regularly received.3 ,
A further distinction in the ambit of garnishment and installment orders
is inherent in their very nature. Garnishment in its essence is an execution
directed against the debtor's debtor, whereas an installment order is a decree
binding upon the debtor personally. This dissimilarity in character may effect,
in some cases, the defeat of garnishment, while an installment order would
still be applicable. Thus employees of the Federal Government are immune
from garnishment, because such a process is considered an interference with
31. See WAIT, MANUAL OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS AND GARNISHE EXI'CU-
TIONS (1937 Supp.) 11. But see Adirondack Furniture Corp. v. Crannell, 167 Misc. 599,
5 N. Y. S. (2d) 840 (County Ct. 1938).
32. William F. Kasting Co. v. Whittle, 174 App. Div. 224, 159 N. Y. Supp. 909
(3d Dep't 1916).
33. Grostein v. Blumenberg Dairy Corp., 139 Misc. 548, 249 N. Y. Supp. 728
(Munic. Ct. 1931) (dairy products); Burns v. Maurer, 72 Misc. 481, 131 N. Y. Supp.
344 (County Ct. 1911).
34. William F. Kasting Co. v. Whittle, 174 App. Div. 224, 159 N. Y. Supp. 909
(3d Dep't 1916).
35. See Brooks Bros. v. Cassebeer, 157 App. Div. 683, 685, 142 N. Y. Supp. 781,
782 (1st Dep't 1913).
36. Bergman v. Buechler, 249 App. Div. 553, 292 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't 1937);
Bascomb v. Heckscher, (N. Y. City Ct.) N. Y. L. J., April 1, 1936, p. 1643, col. 7. Of
course, the court will modify its order, if the contributions cease.
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a federal instrumentality, But their wages are not totally free from a
creditor's levy. Once paid, the remuneration becomes income, instead of
earnings, and, as such, may be subject to orders under Section 793.3s
Mhere the employee works for a family corporation, ostensibfy at a wage
of less than $12.00 per week, the court's power to fix wages for the purposes
of garnishment would seem at first inspection to be a sufficient remedy to
creditors. But should the family corporation refuse to honor the order, the
creditor cannot make his collection without a suit against the employer for
the amount owing under the garnislunent execution. In this action the
previous finding "fixing" the salary is not res judicata, although the employer
may have been a party defendant to the garnishment order.39 The creditor,
endeavoring to prove anew the value of the debtor's services, may be met
by a court which refuses to imply a contract of employment contrary to the
express agreement of the parties.40 Garnishment, therefore, has not only been
ineffective, but has also unreasonably delayed the creditor in his collection.
In this situation, the best remedy would be not a garnishment, but an install-
ment order, for in the latter the court would merely direct the debtor to pay
sums based upon a reasonable value of his services.4'
The difficulties encountered by the creditor of a family corporation employee
reappear to some degree when the debtor obtains his salary through a draw-
ing account against future commissions. Although Section 684 specifies that
all earnings in the form of drawing accounts, commissions, or a share of
profits are garnishable, the difficulty occurs in determining whether the em-
ployer's payments are really earnings. The drawing account is considered
within this classification only when it is charged off entirely against later
37. Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20 (U. S. 1846); see Lichtenstein, Garnishment
of Public Employees (1936) 3 U. OF CHL L. Rxv. 291; (1938) 22 Mi.r. L. Rv. 293.
But the H.O.L.C. has been subjected to third party orders. H. & P. Paint Supply Co.
v. Ortloff, 159 Misc. 886, 289 N. Y. Supp. 367 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
38. 'Reeves v. Crownshield, 162 Misc. 118, 292 N. Y. Supp. 756 (N. Y. City Ct.
1936), aff'd, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937); Bool Floral Co. v. Coyne, 158 Misc.
13, 284 N. Y. Supp. 960 (County Ct. 1936); see (1938) 48 YALE L, J. 322; cf. Dibner
v. Cousminer, 157 Misc. 229, 283 N. Y. Supp. 369 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935); Downing
v. DeVito, 161 Misc. 788, 293 N. Y. Supp. 784 (County Ct. 1937) (V.P.A. employees).
39. Diamond v. Schulte Bakers, Inc., 136 Misc. 195, 240 N. Y. Supp. 663 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1930). The employer may not appeal an order evaluating the employee's
services. Flapan v. Rosenblum, 205 App. Div. 76, 199 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1st Dep't 1923).
40. Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Feldman, 150 "Misc. 24, 268 N. Y. Supp. 340 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1934). Contra: Wood v. Dock & Mill, 193 App. Div. 236, 184 N. Y. Supp.
225 (4th Dep't 1920); Pfeifer v. Palace Market, Inc., 139 Misc. 295, 248 N. Y. Supp.
402 (Munic. Ct. 1931).
41. Economy Leases v. Bierman, 159 Misc. 367, 286 N. Y. Supp. 732 (N. Y. City
Ct 1936); Zeitlin v. Ballenzweig, 157 Misc. 219, 284 N. Y. Supp. 290 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1935). Once rendered, the installment order may be modified when changes in
circumstances warrant it. Powell & Titus, Inc. v. Segal, 250 App. Div. 733, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 362 (2d Dep't 1937); cf. F. E. Compton & Co. v. Williams, 248 App. Div. 545,
290 N. Y. Supp. 984 (4th Dep't 1936).
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commissions. 42 When the employee is personally liable for the repayment
of any excess drawings, the account is considered to be a loan against possible
future commissions rather than earnings.43 Since the drawings may not be
reached, the creditor's remedy is restricted to the commissions. But here
again the creditor may be blocked. If the employee is overdrawn when the
execution upon commissions is served, any commissions thereafter earned are
applicable to the employee's current indebtedness to his employer and until
that loan is satisfied, the lien of the garnishment execution does not attac.'
4
4
But does the employer get a prior lien on future commissions for advances
made to the debtor after the service of garnishment execution? If each advance
were considered as a separate transaction, it would appear that garnishment
takes precedence over all later loans.45 A more reasonable attitude, however,
would be to declare that all drawings within the term of the employment
contract are part of one transaction, similar to a bank's line of credit, and
therefore the employer's priority with respect to future commissions con-
tinues until the termination of that contract. Should the courts adopt the
latter view, debtors whose drawing accounts exceed commissions could per-
petually evade garnishment. Their drawing accounts, as loans, would be
immune from garnishment and their commissions would likewise be exempt,
because necessary to repay the loans. The creditor can, of course, dodge this
predicament by resorting to an installment order. Under Section 793 the
employee's drawing' account, even though a loan, would be income and,
therefore, leviable.
Although the Connecticut creditor, through the application of installment
orders, avoids the entanglements invofved in attempting to garnish coin-
missions and unvalued wages, he is not as fortunate in all situations as he
would be in New York. There is grave doubt, for example, whether his
remedy against debtor seamen is as satisfactory as that provided by New
York. Wages of particular sailors, unlike those of any other type of worker,
have been expressly exempted from garnishment by the Federal Govern-
ment.46 This freedom, however, has been bestowed only upon those seamen
42. Laird v. Carton, 196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E. 822 (1909) ; Hollender v. Friedenberg,
60 Misc. 566, 112 N. Y. Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1908). In the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary, there is no obligation to repay drawing account advances, if
commissions do not equal payments. Kane v. Auto Laks Mfg. Co., 172 N. Y. Snpp. 275
(Sup. Ct. 1918).
43. Franklin Simon & Co. v. Pease & Elliman, 238 App. Div. 614, 265 N. Y. Supp.
199 (1st Dep't 1933).
44. National City Bank of N. Y. v. Bon Ray Dance Frocks, 153 Misc. 549, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 510 (Munic. Ct. 1934). Bookkeeping devices are futile to camouflage commission
payments. Davidow v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 231 App. Div. 300, 246 N, Y.
Supp. 512 (2d Dep't 1930).
45. Cf. Rosenberg v. Parlay Hats, 144 Misc. 519, 258 N. Y. Supp. 949 (Mtnle. Ct.
1932).
46. 38 STAT. 1169 (1915), 46 U. S. C. § 601 (1934).
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engaged in transoceanic, Great Lakes, and Atlantic-to-Pacific trade.7  While
these fortunate debtors are immune from garnishment process in any state,
they, like all other income recipients, may be subjected to an installment
order should they become liable to service in New York. The Connecticut
provision for installment orders, however, might not be applicable to such
debtors, because it is written in terms of "earnings from personal services, '" s
unlike the New York statute where the limits are defined by "inconie." 4 9
An installment order payable from a seaman's wages therefore might be
denied by Connecticut courts on the ground that this process would be an
"arrestment" upon his wages, prohibited by the federal statute.
Not only has the phraseology of the Connecticut statute handicapped the
Connecticut creditor, but the restriction on wage garnishment denies him
any remedy against a debtor outside the court's jurisdiction, but employed
by a corporation doing business within the state. Although New York
permits wage garnishment, the same difficulty formerly confronted creditors
in that state, through the court's refusal to follow the rule of Harris v.
Balk. ° New York in repeated decisions insisted that the situs of a debt for
purposes of garnishment was determined by the domicile of the debtor,*'
unless the debt arose out of a contract made or to be performed within
New York. 52 An amendment to Section 916 of the Civil Practice Act, how-
ever, now allows a levy of attachment on all debts due from non-residents
to other non-residents.53 Thus the wages of a judgment debtor who is
employed by a foreign corporation doing business in New York may be
garnished, regardless of where the employment contract was drawn or was
to be performed. If the debtor is employed outside the state by a foreikn
corporation not doing business within the state, the inability to obtain jritn-
47. 18 STAT. 64 (1874), 46 U. S. C. §544 (1934). The burden of proof is on the
creditor to show that the debtor does not work on an exempt vessel. figliaceco v.
Cappola, 160 Mlisc. 557, 289 N. Y. Supp. 891 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936). Longshoremen
have been held to be within this exemption. Michigan Furniture Co. v. Southern Pacific
Co., 158 Misc. 781, 287 N. Y. Supp. 178 (lunic. Ct. 1936). Likewise a pilot. Blooming-
dale Bros. v. Butler, 150 lisc. 903, 270 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra:
William Jackson Sons, Inc. v. Hauffman, 159 Misc. 182, 237 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
48. See CoN.q. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d.
49. See N. Y. Cv. PRAc. AcT § 793.
50. 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
51. Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 933 (1893); Nat. Broadway
Bank v. Sampson, 179 N. Y. 213, 71 N. E. 766 (1904); Carpenter Y. Farabaugh, 146
Misc. 625, 262 N. Y. Supp. 609 (Munic. Ct. 1933); see Kennedy, Garnishment of In-
tangible Debts in New York (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 689.
52. Where the debtor resided and worked in Pennsylvania for a New York corpora-
tion, his wages were held to be garnishable in New York. Morris Plan Co. of Buffalo
v. Miller, 102 Misc. 470, 169 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
53. The application of this provision to foreign corporations is limited by N. Y.
GEN. Coin. LAw §§224, 225. For the history and results of this change, zee Legis.
(1937) 6 FoRDHA.um L. Rav. 283.
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diction through service prevents the issue of a garnishment order. 4 The
creditor is not wholly without a remedy, however, where the debtor is vithin
the court's jurisdiction, for in such circumstances an installment order may
be obtained.
The New York provisions for third party orders,5 which have no coun-
terpart in Connecticut, would seem to provide creditors with yet another
method for collection from wage earning debtors. Prior to 1935, there was
no doubt that third party orders could not reach a debtor's accruing wages,
since this procedure was applicable only to those debts due but unpaid when
process was served. 6 Section 792 further exempted all wages earned within
the sixty days preceding service,57 thereby rendering this measure practically
worthless as a collection device against employee debtors. The 1935 revisions,
however, permit third party orders to enjoin the transfer of property acquired
by the debtor after service. s A hasty glance at the Civil Practice Act would
thus seem to reveal that a judgment creditor might now serve the debtor's
employer with a third party order enjoining future wage payments; the fund
to be transferred when enough had accumulated to satisfy the judgment. Tile
courts, however, have refused so to construe the statuteY0 In order to avoid
the obvious injustice of allowing a judgment creditor to acquire all the
debtor's earnings by the application of a third party order, it has been held
that Section 794 must be read in connection with the other sections of the
Civil Practice Act on supplementary proceedings., It has been declared
that the limitation of installment orders to ten per cent of the debtor's income
would be unnecessary if a judgment creditor could take everything by means
of a third party order. Not content with divining that "by no New York
statute is it intended that those who work to live [are to] be kept alive by
doles while creditors take every cent of their earnings as they accrue," 0'
54. Penrose & McEniry v. Manogue, 129 Misc. 512, 221 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
55. N. Y. Civ. Pa~c. Acr §§ 794, 795, 796. See note 8, suJpra.
56. In re Trustees of Board of Publication & Sabbath School Work, 22 Misc. 645,
50 N. Y. Supp. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; Hayward v. Hayward, 178 App. Div. 92, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 877 (1st Dep't 1917) ; Hand v. Ortschreib Bldg. Corp., 136 Misc. 692, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1929), iwdified on another ground, 228 App. Div. 835, 241 N. Y.
Supp. 807 (2d Dep't 1930).
57. But cf. Collins v. Connelly, 125 Misc. 871, 212 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
58. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 799; see note 26, supra.
59. Where granted, third party orders have been limited to ten per cent of the
debtor's earnings. Newburger v. Schalit, N. Y. L. J., April 28, 1937, p. 2114, col. 1
(N. Y. City Ct.); Ryan v. Dench, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 22, 1937, p. 1388, col. 3 (N. Y.
City Ct.) ; see CARMoDY, MANUAL OF Nav YoRx PRAcricE (1938) 912, n. 14.
60. 6----10 Barrow St., Inc. v. Pennefather, 164 Misc. 18, 297 N.Y. Supp. 124 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1936); D. L. & W. Coal Co. v. Kenlon, 164 Misc. 32, 297 N. Y. Supp. 126
(N. Y. City Ct. 1937); 1101 Park Ave. Corp. v. Cornell, 133 Misc. 397, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 663 (N. Y. City Ct. 1928) semble.
61. See D. L. & W. Coal Co. v. Kenlon, 164 Misc. 32, 36, 297 N. Y. Supp. 126, 131,
(N. Y. City Ct. 1937).
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some courts have proceeded to assert that the words of Section 792 must
be interpreted to free such earnings from third party orders.G- The exemption
of "the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services rendered
within sixty days next before the institution of the special proceeding, when
- . those earnings are necessary for the use of a family wholly or partly
supported by his wages," has been stretched to mean that such earnings
are exempt from supplementary proceedings for sixty days after their accrual,
regardless of when the proceedings were instituted. If this interpretation
of Section 792 were carried to its logical conclusion, it would entirely nullify
the effect of Section 793. If wages are immune from supplementary pro-
ceedings for sixty days after accrual, the installment order, the most effective
device for the collection of judgments against wage earners, would be inap-
plicable to earnings derived from personal services. The court obviously will
not extend this reasoning to attempts to procure installment orders, but it
could easily have avoided the inconsistency by not endeavoring to expand
Section 792 to absurdity. Since the court has discretion in granting third
party orders,63 it could merely have exercised that power and refused such
petitions on the ground that an adequate remedy was provided by -Section
793.
Crafty debtors have frustrated persistent creditors by assigning future
wages to a third party before a creditor could levy upon them." To prevent
this type of circumvention, Connecticut has completely prohibited the assign-
ment of any portion of an employee's wages. 6 While New York has moved
in the same direction, it has not acted so drastically. Section 46 of the
Personal Property Law"6 now provides that wage assignments under $1,000
must specify the transactions out of which they arose, be notarized, and not
exceed ten per cent of the debtor's earnings.6 7 Since only one assignment
62. See note 60, supra. N. Y. Civ. PRac. Acr § 684 has no application to third party
orders. Reliance Investing Co. v. Power, 136 Misc. 694, 240 N.Y. Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct.
1930). It has been stated that § 792 exempts bank accounts from supplementary proceed-
ings where they represent wages earned sixty days before service if the earnings are
necessary to support a family wholly or partially dependent on the debtor's labor. N.rV,
MAXUAL OF SUPPLEMENTARx PROCEEDINGS AND GARNIsnEE ExECTIboINs (1936) 3565;
cf. Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1928).
63. Conlew v. Thompson, 160 Misc. 551, 289 N. Y. Supp. 862 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936);
see N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act §§ 794, 796.
64. See CommiT=nl oN STATE LwcisLATIoN OF THE Naw Yon BAn AssocrATio.,
BULL. 5 (1932) 162. A debtor may also connive to have a fictitious judgment rendered
against himself. As long as a garnishment execution or an installment order based upon
this collusion is in effect, later valid processes are held in abey-ance.
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d.
66. This provision supersedes any inconsistent parts of N. Y. Pmas. Ppoi. LAw § 42.
Egelhof v. Inwood Credit Union, 155 Misc. 790, 281 N. Y. Supp. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
An assignment of commissions already earned but to be payable in the future does not
fall within the provisions of § 46 of the PEAs. PROP. LAw. In re Fabys, 18 F. Supp. 529
(S. D. N. Y. 1937).
67. The Attorney-General has suggested that this section does not require the state
to accept wage assignments of its employees. Op. A'ry-Gx,:. (1934) 51 ST. D&E'T 247.
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is permitted at a time and since garnishment may not be satisfied until previous
assignments have been completed, 68 the creditor still lacks complete protec-
tion. Where he believes the assignment to be fraudulent, his remedy, except
for an installment order or a suit to set aside the assignment, is to serve
the employer with garnishment execution. He may then wait until his judg-
ment has been satisfied and sue the garnishee. The employer, thereupon,
may be subjected to two payments.69 He is personally liable to the assignee
after notice of the assignment ;70 yet in a suit by a garnisher, whose execution
he ignored while paying the previous assignment, the assignment may be
set aside as fraudulent or ineffective and he may be ordered to pay all sinisi
garnished from the date of service. Since a valid assignment of wages is
quite common, especially through the use of the check-off, now widespread
in well unionized industries, 71 the creditor is often forced to resort to an
installment order. But these orders are granted only after due regard for
prior assignments, the validity of which may not be attacked in this action.
Within its discretion therefore, the court may refuse to issue the order. An
assignment of wages may thus exclude the creditor from relief under Sec-
tion 793, even though the assignment is in fact nugatory.
Wages remain immune from garnishment in Connecticut through statute;
alimony enjoys the same freedom by judicial interpretation. An estraned
wife's income from alimony payments or a separation agreement has been
held no more subject to garnishment execution than a husband's allowance
to his unalienated wife. 72 New York concurs with Connecticut in holding
that such obligations are not debts within the meaning of the garnishment
provisions. 73 Although third party orders appear similar to garnishment in
this respect and the same treatment would be expected, the courts have
eschewed logic for justice. Creditors whose claims were based on the ,ale
of necessaries made after the alimony or separation agreement came into
effect have been permitted, at times, to share in the husband's payments, via
third party orders.7 4 Justification for issuance of these decrees was rested
68. See N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 46.
69. Cf. Hirschberg v. Chic Dress Co., 72 Misc. 339, 130 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct
1911) ; Finelbatt v. Giant Laundry, Inc., 145 Misc. 889, 260 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Munic.
Ct 1932).
70. Continental Purchasing Co. v. Van Raalte Co., 251 App. Div. 151, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 867 (4th Dep't 1937).
71. See Op. ArT'Y-GEx. (1936) 276. In Connecticut, where wage assignments are
invalid, the Attorney-General has suggested that the check-off is not an assignment,
but an act of the employer as the employee's agent. Opinion of Attorney-Gencral (1938)
6 CoNr. L. J. 305.
72. Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826 (1892); Van Valkenburgh
v. Bishop, 164 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1917). See RoTnENBERG, Nrw Yorit LAW or
ALIMONY (1932) 10. Voluntary payments to a separated spouse are not "debtq."
Brooks Bros. v. Cassebeer, 157 App. Div. 683, 142 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1st Dep't 1913).
73. Wright v. Wright, 93 Conn. 296, 105 Atl. 684 (1919).
74. Tappe v. Battelle, 140 Misc. 49, 249 N. Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1931). In
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. Lehman, 151 Misc. 444, 270 N. Y. Supp. 589
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on the ground that they were merely a fulfillment of the avowed purpose of
alimony-to provide the estranged wife and her dependents with support.
Although third party orders were formerly the only procedure by which
deserving creditors could satisfy their judgments, the enactment of Section
793 has provided creditors with an adequate method of recovery.n In these
cases, therefore, the court should now refuse to issue third party decrees, 7
thus forcing the creditor to resort to the more equitable remedy of install-
ment orders wherein the court must take due regard for the debtor's reason-
able requirements and which, unlike the immutable third party order, may be
altered upon a showing by either party of a change of circumstances.
Like al:mony, funds received under pension and workmen's compensation
statutes apparently receive different treatment from other types of income.
Connecticut has limited its immunity to workmen's compensation 7T and to
"any pension moneys received from the United States, while in the hands
of the pensioner."78 New York, on the other hand, by express authorization
has exempted from levy and sale by virtue of an execution all funds from
military pensions7 9 and workmen's compensation.80 Not only are these sums
free from garnishment and third party orders, but so is all property which
may have been purchased solely from this income.s ' It would seem, however,
that the exemption applies only during the lifetime of the person to whom
the fund was paid; for after the pensioner's death, property purchased with
pens'on money has been levied upon by the decedent's creditors.,"-' If the
pension is of the lump payment type, the fund itself is totally immune, even
(N. Y. City Ct. 1933), the order was denied on grounds that a court of inferior juris-
diction could not attempt to override the Supreme Court's decree of payments to the
wife. Such payments may not be attached. Basldn v. Howe, 225 App. Div. 553, 233
N. Y. Supp. 648 (lst Dep't 1929).
75. Installment orders by a court of inferior jurisdiction do not interfere with the
operation of a decree by the Supreme Court. Continental Bank and Trust Co. of N. Y.
v. Flather, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 7, 1935, p. 1725, col. 4 (N. Y. City CL)
76. Except under circumstances similar to Conlew v, Thompson, 160 Misc. 551,
289 N. Y. Supp. 862 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936) where the third party order enjoining pay-
ment to the judgment debtor was allowed to stand only until the debtor submitted to the
court's jurisdiction and an application under Crv. PPAc. Acr § 793.
77. Coxx. GE-. STAT. (1930) § 5260.
78. Coxx. GE-. STAT. (Supp. 1933) § 1672c.
79. N. Y. Civ. Pa.c. Acr § 667.
SO. N. Y. WoRxx. 's Comp. LAw § 33. These funds are exempt even after pay-
ment to the debtor. Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1923). Federal and
state old age assistance are also exempt. N. Y. Pun. WmrELFA L.W § 124(n).
81. Yates County Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 23 N. E. 1103 (1890);
Benedict v. Higgins, 165 App. Div. 611, 151 N. Y. Supp. 42 (3d Dep't 1915) ; Vinciguerra
1. Busam, 169 Misc. 908, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 294 (N. Y. City Ct. 1938) (war veteran's
bonus of 1936). cf. Billings v. Lynch, 161 Misc. 496, 292 N. Y. Supp. 344 (County Ct.
1937). For exemption of income from property purchased with exempt funds, see (1938)
47 Yi.E L. J. 1408.
82. ln re Liddle, 35 Misc. 173, 71 N. Y. Supp. 474 (Surr. Ct. 1901); Smith v.
Blood, 106 App. Div. 317, 94 N. Y. Supp. 667 (3d Dep't 1905).
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after payment to the pensioner's estate.83 As previously indicated, it cannot
be reached either by third party orders or by garnishment, because of express
statutory exemption. The fund also lies outside the scope of an installment
order, since by definition that provision is inapplicable to lump payments.
This obstacle is overcome if the pension is allotted in installments; but the
creditor may still be balked in his attempt to obtain an installment order
payable solely from such income. While pension and alimony payments are
similar in that both are allowances for the maintenance and care of those
who have lost their main source of support, a pensioner, unlike an alimony
recipient, may successfully ignore the claims of those who advance neces-
saries in reliance upon his steady income.8 4
The two states differ in their recovery process when the debtor's property
is in the possession of another. Connecticut's garnishment, as previously
indicated, is usually followed by a scire facias.8 5 Controversies over title to
the property or the existence of the garnishee's debt to the debtor can be
settled only in this later action, 6 in which the garnishee will be protected
from any unlawful exposure to double liability.87 Like a scire facias, the
New York third party order cannot be procured until judgment has been
rendered against the debtor, but unlike the scire facias action, this pro-
ceeding may not be utilized to adjust disputes in title.88
83. In re Cerello's Estate, 155 Misc. 709, 281 N. Y. Supp. 599 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
In re Dickerson's Estate, 168 Misc. 54, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 86 (Surr. Ct. 1938). An
otherwise exempt pension may be sequestered or levied upon by a warrant of seizure to
pay back alimony or support an abandoned wife. Monek v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656,
172 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1918) ; Hodson v. City Employees' Retirement System,
243 App. Div. 480, 278 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1st Dep't 1935). Contra: Riker v. Riker,
160 Misc. 117, 289 N. Y. Supp. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (intent of Act was to make proceeds
of Veteran's Bonus Bond payable to veteran only).
84. Ley Realty Corp. v. Foley, 161 Misc. 666, 293 N. Y. Supp. 795 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1937) (indebtedness for rent). But where the debtor has another source of income
in addition to an exempt pension, the amount of the installment payments are estimated
on the basis of his total income. Bowes v. Perkins, 169 Misc. 624, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
525 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
85. See note 9, supra.
86. Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, 107 Conn. 545, 141 Atl. 884 (1928). tut
the merits of the plaintiff's claim are not open to question in a scire facias. See Cunning-
ham Lumber Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 77 Conn. 628, 630, 60 Atl. 107, 108
(1905).
87. Where the debtor assigned his insurance claims after the defendant was garnished
and the assignees collected from the defendant in an action in New York despite the
defense of a prior garnishment, the court refused to enforce the garnishment. Crouse
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 176, 14 Atl. 82 (1888). Where Haiti refused to recognize
a Connecticut garnishment and forced the garnishee to pay the debtor in full, scire
facias on the garnishment was denied. Parker, Peebles & Knox v. National Fire Ins.
Co., 111 Conn. 383, 150 Atl. 313 (1930). But cf. Kassover v. Willimantic Trust Co.,
122 Conn. 166, 187 AtI. 907 (1936).
88. Kenney v. South Shore Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 201 N. Y. 89, 94 N. E. 606
(1911); Powley v. Dorland Building Co., Inc., 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 860 (2d Dep't 1939).
Nor has the court power under Civ. PRc. AcT § 796 to direct the judgment debtor to
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Few difficulties now arise in construing the exemptions from scire facias
or third party orders, since the scope of these immunities has been determined
relatively well in the past by statute and judicial interpretation. In Con-
necticut the major difficulties have originated in the definition of the scope
of "indebtedness." 8 9 It has been held that indebtedness does not occur until
there is an existing duty to pay either at present or in the future, but it is
not necessary that the obligation be liquidated.00 The indebtedness of a bank
or insurance company continues to exist even though a cashier's check or
draft has been delivered to the debtor, since in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, these instruments do not discharge the garnishee's liability
to the debtor, but are merely evidences of the debt until they are presented
and paid.91 Should the instruments be negotiable, a transfer by the debtor
to a bona fide holder would undoubtedly erase the garnishee's obligation to
the debtor, even though the assignment were made subsequent to the service
of garnishment.92
The chief confusion in immunities from third party orders 3 results from
attempts to secure the proceeds of the debtor's insurance where the right
to change the beneficiary has been reserved. 4 Two overlapping statutes have
exempted the proceeds of insurance from the insured's creditors where the
beneficiary is neither the insured 9 nor his estate.00 Although the Connecticut
turn over property whose title is in dispute. Orloff v. Pester, 143 Misc. 625, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 111 (1st Dep't 1932); Schmelzel v. Mackey, 144 Misc. 67, 258 N. Y. Supp. 33
(Sup. Ct 1932).
89. A claim in tort is not a garnishable "debt". Holcomb v. Winchester, 52 Conn.
447 (1885). Neither is property held by police for use as evidence. Bruchal v. Smith,
109 Conn. 316, 146 AtL 491 (1929). Nor money paid into custody of the court as bail.
Lewis v. Hopkins, 96 Conn. 356, 114 At. 91 (1921); cf. In re Rothschild, 84 App. Div.
196, 82 N. Y. Supp. 558 (1st Dep't 1903).
90. Ransom -% Bidwell, 89 Conn. 137, 93 At. 134 (1915); Finch v. Great Amer.
Ins. Co., 101 Conn. 332, 125 At. 628 (1924); Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saich, 107
Conn. 545, 141 At. 884 (1928); cf. Sand-Blast File-Sharpening Co. v. Parsons, 54
Conn. 310, 7 At. 716 (1886); Heilman v. St. Cloud Restaurant, Inc., 164 Misc. 15,
297 N. Y. Supp. 111 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
91. Alexiou v. Bridgeport-Peoples' Savings Bank, 110 Conn. 397, 148 Adt. 374
(1930); Kossover v. Willimantic Trust Co., 122 Conn. 166, 187 At. 907 (1936). But
cf. 2 MORSp, BA.xKs AND BAK IG (6th ed. 1928) § 545.
92. See McCormick v. Warren, 74 Conn. 234, 239, 50 AU. 740, 741 (1901); Reade
i% Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 121 Conn. 309, 314, 184 AtI. 646, 648 (1936).
93. The diiculties caused by the doctrine of In re Delaney, 256 N. Y. 315, 176 N. -.
407 (1931) that receivers might not be appointed for domestic corporations have been
erased by an amendment to N. Y. Civ. PmAc. Act § 804 ex-pressly providing for the
appointment of receivers for such debtors.
94. Of course, creditors may not defeat the beneficiary's interest where the right to
change the beneficiary is not reserved. VANCE, IN sUYRAcE (2d ed. 1930) § 162. A com-
prehensive treatment of creditors' rights in life insurance v.ill be found in Cohen,
Execution Process and Life Insurance (1939) 39 CoL. L RE. 139.
95. The person whose life is insured, not the contracting party.
96. N. Y. Dos. Rm. LAW § 52; N. Y. Izzs. LAW § 55(a). Section 55(a) impliedly
repeals § 52. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Crosney, 251 N. Y. 189,
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provision for exemption of these funds from garnishment T is no less vague
than New York's, there appears to be no reported litigation on its construc-
tion. But because of the similarity of the provisions, it is expected that
Connecticut will follow New York's interpretation. In the latter state the
cash surrender value of a policy written in favor of a third party is immune
from the insured's creditors or trustee in bankruptcy in the absence of a
fraudulent change of beneficiary. 9s Most industrial policies may not be
surrendered by creditors, although payable to the insured's estate, since under
certain conditions the proceeds may be paid to blood relatives or other persons
found to be equitably entitled to them.99 In either the industrial or the
ordinary type of policy, the degree of control retained by the insured in
reserving the right to change the beneficiary or to assign the policy is im-
material for purposes of this immunity. 00 Since disability payments under
such policies are available for the benefit of the insured, not his beneficiary,
they were at one time amenable to a creditor's levy.'"' To remedy this
obvious injustice the legislature has exempted such payments from process.'"
When examination has revealed that an unpaid dividend exists, creditors have
attempted its seizure as a debt owed by the insurance company to the debtor.
Third party orders have not been granted, however, so long as the dividcnd';
167 N. E. 217 (1929). But cf. United States Mortgage & Trust Co, v. Ruggles, 137
Misc. 895, 244 N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (1932).
The exemption does not apply if the policy is payable to the insured. Lion Credit Union
v. Gutman, 148 Misc. 620, 265 N. Y. Supp. 479 (N. Y. City Ct. 1932). Or his estate.
Rock-Wood & Co. v. Trop, 212 App. Div. 883, 208 N. Y. Supp. 459 (2d Dep't 1925). Or
his executors. Beigel v. Windschauer, 153 Misc. 389, 274 N. Y. Supp. 850 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1934). These statutes, of course, do not exempt the proceeds from the beneficiary's
creditors. Amberg v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 171 N. Y. 314, 63 N. E. 1111 (1902).
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) § 1568c.
98. Maurice v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 121 Misc. 427, 201 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup, Ct.
1923); Gershman v. Berliner, 214 App. Div. 196, 211 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't 1925).
See VAxCE, IxsuRA.;cE (2d ed. 1930) § 164; Fraenkel, Crcditors' Rights in Lie 1nsur-
ance (1935) 4 FORDHAm, L. Rav. 35; Comment (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 236. Where
a change of beneficiary is made to defraud creditors, the entire proceeds may be levied
upon. Stoudt v. Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Misc. 675, 271 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct.
1933). But where premiums are paid in insolvency, only so much of the cash surrender
value as is traceable to these premiums are available to the trustee in banl:ruptcy. In re
Goodchild, 10 F. Supp. 491 (E. D. N. Y. 1935). For a borderline conveyance held not
to be in fraud of creditors, see Bank of United States v. Glickman, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
349 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
99. Sullivan v. Bock, 157 Misc. 327, 284 N. Y. Supp. 297 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935).
100. In re Afessinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, Reilly v.
Messinger, 279 U. S. 855 (1929); 40 West 57th St. Realty Corp. v. Starr, 149 Misc.
470, 267 N. Y. Supp. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
101. Oriole Textile Co. v. Robert Silk & Woolen Co., 147 Misc. 524, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 447 (N. Y. City Ct. 1932); Herbach v. Herbach, 148 Misc. 33, 265 N. Y. Supp.
144 (N. Y. City Ct. 1933).
102. N. Y. Ixs. LAW § 55(b); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d(b).
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are not appropriated to the use of the insured.' 0 3 If the dividends are to
be applied for the payments of future premiums, they continue as "proceeds
and avails" of the policy inuring to the benefit of the beneficiary, and, ac-
cordingly, remain exempt.104 The only dividends, therefore, upon which a
creditor may levy are those which the insured has elected to receive in casb}0
In both states, where the proceeds of a life insurance policy are left with
an insurance company under a trust or annuity arrangement, the terms of
the agreement may immunize the accruing benefits. Connecticut, however,
limits this freedom to avails in the possession of domestic insurance company
trustees.100 While New York does not thus restrict its immunity, it does permit
a creditor's levy when the judgment was rendered for the sale of neces-
saries. 10 7 This exemption applies not only to payments from the principal
of the policy, but also to interest and earnings therefrom.0 3 Mthough the
proceeds of most insurance policies are free from the claims of the insured's
creditors, this provision frees the proceeds from the claims of the benefcdiary's
creditors when the benefits are kept in trust rather than paid outright. In
view of the express statutory restriction to insurance company trusts, the
immunity in New York cannot be stretched to include so-called "insurance
trusts" in which someone other than the insurance company acts as trustee.
The Connecticut exemption, however, is merely an extension of the protec-
tion already afforded spendthrift trusts, for in Connecticut the income of
a spendthrift trust is not liable to the claims of the beneficiary's creditors, nor
may it be alienated or assigned by the cestui. 10 9
103. In re Keil, 88 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 703 (1937);
Randik Realty Corp. v. Moseyeff, 147 Misc. 618, 263 N. Y. Supp. 440 (N. Y. City Ct.
1933) ; Robro Realty Corp. v. Lazarus, 161 Misc. 610, 291 N. Y. Supp. 678 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1936); cf. New York Plumbers' Specialties Co., Inc. v. Stein, 140 Misc. 161, 250
N. Y. Supp. 220 (1st Dep't 1931). But cf. 242 Vest 38th St. Corp. v. Meyrowitz,
162 isc. 488, 293 N. Y. Supp. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 703, 290
N. Y. Supp. 109 (1st Dep't 1936).
104. Ibid.
105. Cf. Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Frank, 161 Misc. 613, 291 N. Y. Supp. 691
(. Y. City Ct. 1936).
106. CoqN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1569c.
107. N. Y. PEas. Psor. LAw § 15.
108. Such proceeds are exempt from garnishment. Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 263
N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 74S (1934). And installment orders. Crossman Co. v. Rauch,
248 App. Div. 758, 288 N. Y. Supp. 827 (2d Dep't 1936). Although an insurance trust
may be merely a contract (N. Y. BANK. LAw § 131(3) which states who may Le
trustees makes no provision for life insurance company trustees), if the contract is
subject to and governed by the laws of New York, § 15 of fie PFns. Pnov. Lw will
protect beneficiaries in other states. Annis v. Pilkewitz, 287 Mich. 63, 2.8 N. V. 905
(1938). But cf. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 253 N. Y. 32, 179
N. E. 250 (1932). For a treatment of this problem, see Giuswvor, SPE-,mranrr TnusTs
(1936) §§ 110-144.
109. Foley v. Hastings, 107 Conn. 9, 139 At. 305 (1927) ; see Bridgeport-City Trust
Co. v. Beach, 119 Conn. 131, 141, 174 At]. 308, 312 (1934); Reilly v. State, 119 Conn.
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The Connecticut creditor of a beneficiary of a trust other than the spend-
thrift or insurance type has two methods for the satisfaction of his claim.
He may proceed against the cestui by means of a creditor's bill,110 or lie may
garnish the trust income."' Neither remedy is restricted merely to judgment
creditors, since a judgment may be rendered in the action in which relief
is sought." 2 By means of the equity creditor's bill, the future income of the
trust may be subjected entirely to the payment of the creditor's claim. But
such a suit is an in personam action against the beneficiary and may not be
instituted by the execution of a garnishment. Unlike the equity proceeding
which lays a continuing levy, garnishment catches only the income then due
the cestui from the trust. 3  It is useful, therefore, only when the beneficiary
is outside the jurisdiction and may not be personally served with process
to commence an equity creditor's action.
Although the New York judgment creditor of a trust beneficiary may
obtain a remedy from the income of all trusts, not of the insurance nature,
he must distinguish between the various classes of trusts. Where the settlor
has reserved the trust income for himself," 4 the judgment creditor need not
seek the available processes of garnishment or an installment order. A more
adequate redress is supplied by an action for discovery and satisfaction. 116
This proceeding is neither limited to ten per cent of the trust income as in
garnishment nor to the excess over the reasonable requirements of the
debtor as in installment orders, and may be procured notwithstanding the
settlor's effort to create a spendthrift trust." 6 The creditor may thereby
appropriate the entire trust income, even though the trust was established
previous to the claim upon which his judgment rests.117 Although this action
508, 511, 177 AtI. 528, 529 (1935). For definition of spendthrift trust, see Carter v.
Brownell, 95 Conn. 216, 111 Atl. 182 (1920).
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5723. But such action may not be brought against
unassignable trust income, even though the trust is not of the spendthrift type. Parker,
Holmes & Co. v. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Ati. 479 (1907).
111. Under CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5763.
112. It is not necessary that a judgment should have been rendered when a creditor's
bill is brought. Huntington v. Jones, 72 Conn. 45, 43 Atl. 564 (1899).
113. Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn. 293, 97 Atl. 337 (1916).
114. Such trusts are void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of the
settlor. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 34. After the settlor's death, creditors may resort
to the trust corpus to the extent that the general estate is insufficient to pay their
claims. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 163 Misc. 459, 297 N. Y. Supp. 88
(Sup. Ct. 1938), reV'd on another ground, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E. (2d) 553 (1933).
115. N. Y. Civ. PRc. AcT § 1189. It is also possible for the creditor to levy on the
corpus through a third party order under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 796. Liberty Storage
& Warehouse Co. v. VanWyck, 165 Misc. 890, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 149 (N. Y. City Ct.
1938) (settlor reserved the power of appointment by will. See N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAW
§ 152).
116. The income of a spendthrift trust founded for the settlor's own benefit is not
exempt from creditors' claims. Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898).
117. Dillon v. Spilo, 250 App. Div. 543, 294 N. Y. Supp. 876 (1st Dep't 1937), afj'd,
275 N. Y. 275, 9 N. E. (2d) 864 (1937).
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has been utilized most in upsetting trusts contrived to defraud creditors, proof
of the debtor's purpose is unnecessary. Creditors of beneficiaries whose trusts
have been set up by third parties, however, must look elsewhere for their
recovery, since such trusts are expressly exempt from levy. 1s
Where a trust has been conceived for the benefit of someone other than
the settlor,"x9 the beneficiary's creditor may choose either of two paths of
recoupment-a garnishment execution " or a judgment creditor's bill in
equity.' 2 ' While these two approaches are not coterminous, they are con-
current, enabling the creditor to resort to the one from which he may most
adequately attain reparation.212 Section 684 authorizes garnishment only
when the funds are "due and owing" or to "become due and owing" to the
debtor. The income of a discretionary trust has been held to fall within this
requirement, since the award necessarily precedes the actual delivery of
the income to the beneficiary. Throughout this interval, however brief, the
money is "due and owing" to the debtor and therefore, may le levied upon
by a garnishment execution.=
Although the statutory provision for a creditor's bill mentions only revenue
from real estate, it is equally applicable to all types of trust income. 2- Like
garnishment, this recovery is limited in amount.25 Instead of a restriction
to ten per cent of the receipts, the equity action is confined to the surplus
income beyond the sum necessary for the education and support of the
beneficiary in accordance with his station in life, previous education and
habits, and means of support. Equity will not dismiss this proceeding merely
because there is a remedy at law under Section 684, since garnishment is
inadequate where its execution will require a lengthy period for the complete
118. N. Y. Civ. Paac. Acr § 1196.
119. All such trusts have "spendthrift" characteristics. See N. Y. Pims. Pnop. LAw § 15
and N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 103. Where the settlor has reserved the power of revoca-
tion "he is to be still deemed the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the
rights of creditors and purchasers are concerned." N.. Y. RA.L Pnop. LAw § 145. This
section applies to personalty as well. Syracuse Trust Co. Y. Fuller, 140 Misc. 918, 252
N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
120. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 684.
121. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 98.
122. Heppenstall v. Bandouine, 73 Misc. 118, 132 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1st Dep't 1911).
For a general treatment of creditors' rights in trust income, see Gmswoiz, Siem7=nurr
TRusvs (1936) §§ 331-393.
123. Hamilton v. Drogo, 241 N. Y. 401, 150 N. E. 496 (1926), (19-6) 26 CoL. L
Rnv. 776.
124. Jenks v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 170 App. Div. 830, 156 N. Y. Supp. 478
(1st Dep't 1915); Spellman v. Sullivan, 43 F. (2d) 762 (S. D. N. Y. 1930). And is
available for the satisfaction of back alimony. WVetmore v. Vetmore, 149 N. Y. 520,
44 N. E. 169 (1896).
125. But the Federal Government may satisfy an income tax lien against trust income
without regard for N. Y. Cirv. Paac. Acr § 684 or N. Y. REAL Proe. LAwv § 93. In re
Rosenberg's Will, 269 N. Y. 247, 199 N. E. 206 (1935), (1935) 44 YALE L J. 1116,
(1935) 48 HAsv. L. R.Ev. 1441.
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satisfaction of the judgment.126 The drawback to a creditor's bill is that it
places upon the creditor the burden of alleging and proving that a surplus
exists.127 The creditor will probably ignore this device unless either the trust
income has been previously garnished or so huge a surplus exists that the
benefits he will derive from the prompter discharge of his judgment will
outweigh the detriments involved.
While the words of the trust instrument are important to determine the
settlor's intent, they do not affect the creditor's relief. Since the grantor
could not exempt his property during his lifetime, it is fruitless for him to
make his bequest in such terms as "nor shall any creditor or other person
have the right or power to subject the income to legal or equitable pro-
cess." 1 28  Equally futile are settlors' attempts to thwart possible future
creditors of the beneficiary by providing that the income shall be applied
for the itse of the beneficiary. No distinction is drawn between this trust
and one in which the income is to be paid directly to the cestui. 12" Where
the beneficiaries are alternative or joint, the creditor of one may levy only
upon the portion of the receipts which is appropriated for the debtor. If the
alternative or joint cestuis are the debtor and/or his dependents, however,
the rights of the creditor are the same as if the trust were completely for the
benefit of the debtor. Nothing has been added by the express provision,
since the beneficiary's dependents could have demanded a share of the income
even though the terms of the bequest made no direction for their support. 130
Ordinarily when the creditor finds that another more vigilant associate has
already subjected income to garnishment, he seeks an installment order. 13ut
he may not procure such a decree against a trust beneficiary. Section 792,
which exempts from supplementary proceedings "the seizure of, or other
interference with, any property . . . held in trust for a judgment debtor,
where the trust has been created by . . . a person other than the judg-
ment debtor," was held in Kaplan v. Peser' I to apply to trust income even
after payment. Although this decision was unanimous, logical consistency
might have forced the court to regard trust receipts as no different from other
income; that an installment order to debtors to be paid from trust revenue
is no more an interference with the trust than an installment order to a
federal employee to be paid from earnings is an interference with a federal
instrumentality. Apparently, the potential unfairness of installment orders
126. Heppenstall v. Bandouine, 73 Misc. 118, 132 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1st Dep't 1911).
127. Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1902) ; Rowe
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 132 Misc. 651, 230 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
128. Sand v. Beach, 270 N. Y. 281, 200 N. E. 821 (1936).
129. Ibid.
130. See Sand v. Beach, 270 N. Y. 281, 285, 200 N. E. 821, 823 (1936); RESTAT-.
MENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 157.
131. 273 N. Y. 147, 7 N. E. (2d) 21 (1937), rev'zg, 247 App. Div. 660, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 651 (2d Dep't 1936). But some lower courts had previously adhered to this
doctrine. Barlow v. Beach, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 20, 1935, p. 1958, col. 2 (N. Y. City Ct.) ;
Avon Park Realty Corp. v. Matthew, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 5, 1936, p. 655, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.).
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when utilized against trust income motivated the distinction. The ex parte
nature of supplementary proceedings provides adequate protection to wage
earning debtors, since it is relatively easy for the court to determine his
actual wage or a reasonable value thereof; it is wholly inappropriate, how-
ever, for ascertaining the yield of an involved and uncertain trust. This
protection is afforded botl by garnishment where a definite percentage of
the trust income, regardless of amount, may be levied upon, and by an equity
creditor's suit, where the trustee must be a party. In the latter process, the
presence of the trustee, who has accurate knowledge of tie character and
potential income of the trust, shields the debtor from any injustice which
may be perpetrated by an excessive levy. The court in Kaplan z. Pvyscr
therefore implied that a creditor's levy must be restricted to these two more
equitable devices.
32
Having acquired the desired process, whether a garnishment execution.
installment order, or a third party order, the creditor is not assured of
automatic payment. Recipients, recalcitrant to the court's order or acting
in outright disobedience, may further impede the creditor's collection. As
previously indicated, the Connecticut creditor may be forced to sue the
garnishee on a scire facias133 3 In New York, however, if the garnishee fails
to acknowledge the garnishment, the creditor's only recourse is to wait until
a substantial sum has accumulated under the execution and then sue the
garnishee for that aggregate. All that may be exacted in this litigation is
the amount that the garnishee should have paid between the institution of
garnishment and the commencement of the present action.134 Should the
nonpaying garnishee become a bankrupt before the creditor's collection suit,
the garnisher, having no preferred claim against the garnishee, would occupy
the same position as any other creditor, sharing pro rata in the bankrupt's
assets. Another risk which the creditor must assume is the possibility of
the debtor's going into bankruptcy before the garnishment has been satisfied.
Although the mere adjudication of bankruptcy operates as neither a discharge
nor an automatic halt to the garnishment,31 the debtor may secure a stay-
order coincident to the filing of his petition. Pending discharge, the garnirliee
continues making the required deductions from salary.'13 The fund which
132. Cf. In re Ungrich, 201 N. Y. 415, 94 N. E. 999 (1911); Judis v. fartin, 218
App. Div. 402, 218 N. Y. Supp. 423 (1st Dep't 1926), appcal disniisscd, 244 X. Y. 695,
155 N. E. 916 (1927).
133. See note 85, supra.
134. Decorative Furniture Frame Corp. v. Strand Art Period Furniture Co., Inc.,
144 Mfisc. 1, 257 N. Y. Supp. 631 (Munic. Ct. 1932). The creditor may not enforce
execution by court orders or contempt. Kahn v. Coles, 115 N. Y. Supp. 8S5 (Sup. Ct.
1909); Keve v. Columbia Kid Hair Curlers Iffg. Co., 161 App. Div. 918, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 1072 (1st Dep't 1914).
135. Cf. In re Loftus, 16 F. Supp. 711 (NV. D. N. Y. 1936).
136. In re Van Buren, 164 Fed. M,3 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Bed:, 233 Fed. 653
(S. D. N. Y. 1915); cf. It re Brecher, 19 F. Supp. 23 (S. D. N. Y. 1937) (suggestion
that the state court should similarly modify a bankrupt's installment order).
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thus accumulates passes to either the debtor or creditor depending on whether
a discharge is granted or denied. A discharge frees the bankrupt's earnings
from all garnishment payments subsequent to the date of bankruptcy adjudi-
cation, even though the state court does not modify its order accordingly. 131
The enforcement of third party and installment orders lies not in further
suit, but in the summary process of contempt. 138 The debtor may purge
himself of his contempt by paying a fine whose size is limited to the creditor's
actual loss-the default at the time of the hearing.' 39 As in all contempts,
the failure to meet the fine subjects the debtor to imprisonment, which is
not a violation of the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.1 40
Although the bankruptcy of the debtor does not seriously affect the creditor
who has procured a third party order, 41 it may defeat the collection of an
installment order.' 42 The discharge from bankruptcy also discharges the
debtor's obligation to complete installment payments subsequent to the federal
court's stay-order. 43 While previous judgments may be discharged in
bankruptcy, a contempt may not.144 Even after the discharge, therefore, the
state court may fine the debtor for contempt for failure to make installment
payments which were due prior to the institution of bankruptcy 145 While
ordinary debtors may avoid future garnishment or installment payments by
going into voluntary bankruptcy, a trust beneficiary is not so fortunate.
137. Brenen v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 189 App. Div. 685, 178 N. Y. Supp. 846
(1st Dep't 1919); Weinstein v. Strubble, 142 Misc. 575, 255 N. Y. Supp. 354 (Munlc.
Ct. 1932).
138. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 801.
139. Williamson v. Drogaris, 248 App. Div. 627, 288 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't
1936) ; Barnard v. Barnard, 251 App. Div. 745, 296 N. Y. Supp. 155 (2d Dep't 1937).
140. Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937), (1937) 37 CoL.
L. REv. 1216, (1938) 5 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 305, (1938) 22 MiNx. L. REv. 424.
141. Where the debtor becomes bankrupt subsequent to service upon a third party
for appearance in supplementary proceedings, but prior to the issuance of an order, the
creditor acquires no lien superior to the rights of the bankruptcy trustee. In re Neptune
Avenue, 165 Misc. 309, 299 N. Y. Supp. 736 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
142. 52 STAT. 875, 11 U. S. C. A. § 107 (Supp. 1938) discharges all liens arising
within four months prior to the time of filing a petition in bankruptcy. But by N. Y.
Civ. PRAuc. AcT §§ 807, 808 the title of a supplementary proceeding receiver relates back
to the institution of the proceeding. It is possible, therefore, for the creditor to obtain
a preference by commencing supplementary proceedings with the service of a subpoena
under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 774 and then waiting four months before taking the next
step-the appointment of a receiver. This technique of perfecting a "secret" lien was
successful in In re Unity Cleaners & Dyers, 24 F. Supp. 562 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
143. S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Fleischer, 165 Misc. 175, 300 N. Y. Supp. 617
(N. Y. City Ct. 1937).
144. In re Koronsky, 170 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909) ; In re Thomashefsky, 51 F.
(2d) 1040 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
145. In re Morris Plan Co., 164 Misc. 712, 299 N. Y. Supp. 475 (N. Y. City Ct.
1937) ; Rosevine Realty Corp. v. Stich, 164 Misc. 339, 298 N. Y. Supp. 758 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1937), (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 547.
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Cestui que trust debtors who sought bankruptcy to evade creditors have
found, much to their dismay, that future attachable trust income is an asset
to be weighed in determining insolvency.1 40 When they have been declared
bankrupt, their trust income, as a product of an asset in existence at the date
of adjudication, is unaffected. Even after discharge, therefore, their trustee
in bankruptcy, who has all the rights of a judgment creditor, 14T may levy
upon their trusts receipts to pay off creditors.1 4 8 Thus, while creditors of a
trust beneficiary may be handicapped because installment orders are denied
to them, they are, in result, compensated through their ability to enforce
payment even after the debtor's bankruptcy, when they can no longer obtain
a judgment.
Fr6m this survey it seems justifiable to conclude that the New York
provisions for garnishment and supplemental proceedings, despite their com-
plexity, result in a system of creditor relief superior to that in Connecticut.
Relief is available in New York in some situations in which it is lacking
in Connecticut; and even in situations which are provided for in Connecticut,
the greater complexity of the New York provisions, though raising problems
in the application of the statutes, leads to more comprehensive and flexible
creditor relief than that given by the Connecticut law, since debtors exempt
under one provision may often be caught by another. Moreover, this flexi-
bility does not lead to any real injustice to the debtor. Even when deprived
of exemption, he is provided with adequate protection by the very nature of
the levies, which preserve to him a fair proportion of his income, according
either to a fixed percentage or to his reasonable needs. Further, considering
the comparative scarcity of higher court precedents, the decisions show a
remarkable lack of conflict in working out the relation of the different reme-
dies. The courts have done much to dispel the confusion originally resulting
from the complexity of the statutory provisions; and have woven the com-
plementary sections into a pattern which supplies to the allied problems of
creditor relief and debtor protection a solution which seems at once more
complete and more equitable than that afforded by the more rigid Connecticut
system.
146. Syracuse Engineering Co., Inc. v. Haight, 97 F. (Zd) 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 193S).
Sums accumulating under a garnishment based on a collusive judgment have been held
an asset in bankruptcy. In re Adler, 79 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
147. 52 STAT. 879, 11 U. S. C. A. § 110c (Supp. 1938), formerly 30 STAT. 557 (1893),
as amended by 32 STAT. 799 (1903) and 36 STAT. 840 (1910), 11 U. S. C. §75a(2)
(1934).
148. The trustee may levy against trust income under N. Y. Cv. PRAc. Acr § 624.
In re Irving Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 102, 195 N. E. 811 (1935); In ro Posl-nzer, 101
Misc. 100, 166 N. Y. Supp. 811 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 181 App. Div. 915, 167 N. Y.
Supp. 1122 (3d Dep't 1917). Or he may reach the surplus income under N. Y. REAL
PRoP. LAW § 98. In re Morris, 204 Fed. 770 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ; Jenks v. Title Guar-
antee & Trust Co., 170 App. Div. 830, 156 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1915).
